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  Abstract
Fact-finding is invariably a part of administrative decision-
making. In administrative law procedures the courts in general refrain from 
repeating this fact-finding process but, instead, review the fact-finding procedure. 
This contribution seeks to examine the requirements placed by the Community 
courts on the national courts’ reading of the facts in matters involving EC law. 
In this context, a parallel will be drawn with the standards upheld by the Com-
munity courts as regards their own review of facts, in the context of direct appeals 
against decisions taken by the Community institutions. It will be examined to 
what extent this review by the Community courts agrees or contrasts with the 
review performed in Dutch administrative law courts. A more uniform method of 
reviewing facts could enhance the harmonisation and implementation of EC law.
 1 Introduction 
For the implementation of European law it is of great 
importance how and with which intensity national courts review whether 
a national decision agrees with EC law. An important part of this review 
concerns the factual findings made by the decision-maker, an administrative 
authority. Dutch administrative law courts and fact-finding, though, make 
a difficult combination. On the one hand, the principle of the dispensation 
of justice on the basis of substantive truth is of paramount importance. On 
the other hand, there is often only limited room for truth finding during the 
legal proceedings and the courts’ decisions hardly ever include a final opin-
ion on the facts. In general, Dutch administrative law courts usually only 
review whether the investigation carried out by the administration has been 
sufficient, on the basis of principles such as the requirement of due care and 
the duty to state reasons. In that case the courts themselves do not have to 
carry out all kinds of complicated factual assessments. 
If we consider this interpretation of duties by the Dutch administrative 
law courts from the European law perspective, a few question marks are in 
  This article is based on a publication in Dutch: ‘De toetsing van de feitenvaststelling in 
Europees perspectief’, in: T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden & E. Steyger (eds.), Europees recht 
effectueren, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 2007, p. 5-42. Translation costs were partly 
funded by the KNAW Vertaalfonds.
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order. Do the courts at present actually offer private individuals enough legal 
protection, so that they can effectuate their rights derived from EC law and 
do they sufficiently check if the administration has complied with EC law? 
Should they not review fact-finding more intensively and render a final opin-
ion thereon? Arguably, it is only when the facts in dispute have been estab-
lished definitively that it is possible to determine whether or not a European 
legal rule has been applied correctly. 
This contribution seeks to examine the requirements placed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) on the 
national courts’ opinion on the facts in matters involving Community law. 
In this context, a parallel will be drawn with the requirements placed by the 
Community courts on their own review of facts in assessing a direct appeal 
against decisions taken by the Community institutions. It will be examined 
to what extent this review by the Community courts agrees or contrasts with 
the Dutch review. If we were to find out that our national review of the fact-
finding agrees to a large extent with the review by the Community courts, 
we have to worry little about the danger of future infringements. However, 
if there turn out to be differences between the two methods of review, the 
question is whether there is sufficient justification for this. An adjustment 
of national review might lead to a more effective implementation of Commu-
nity law.2 In this respect a better understanding of methods of review of fact-
finding serves a broader goal. The harmonization of substantive law does 
not as such guarantee the uniform application of harmonized law. Rules 
of evidence, like the evaluation of evidence, the standard of proof and the 
burden of proof, in the various procedural laws of the Member States will 
highly affect the way a norm is applied. A more uniformed review method 
of facts could enhance the implementation of Community law.
Section two and three describe the way in which the Dutch administra-
tive law courts review assessments of the facts in administrative decisions. 
Attention is also paid to the debate in academic literature. Section four sets 
out this Dutch debate from the EC law perspective. Section five and six deal 
with the standard of review of facts applied by the Community courts. A 
conclusion and some final observations are laid down in section seven.
2  This could be called the ‘PF-method’ (proactive and facilitating: the legal implementation, 
application and enforcement of European law may be simplified and facilitated by means 
of general provisions of national administrative law even without European law forcing 
to this), see P.C. Adriaanse, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden & Y.E. Schuurmans, ‘Effec-
tive Implementation of European Community Law. A Facilitating Role of Dutch General 
Administrative Law’, [2008] Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, nr. 22E, p. 5-.
  Mina Hattaka & Hannu Tapani Klami, ‘Evidence and European Law’, [994] Tidskrift utgive-
nav Juridiska Föreningen i Finland, p. 55-56.
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 2  Dutch Administrative Law Courts, Fact-Finding 
and the Principle of Due Care 
Dutch administrative law courts have various means to 
investigate the facts during judicial proceedings. If the parties disagree 
about the facts, the court may investigate the facts itself or order the parties 
to submit additional proof. Various articles from Chapter 8 of the General 
Administrative Law Act (GALA) make it clear that the administrative law 
courts are independently competent to investigate and establish facts. Appel-
late courts have jurisdiction over the facts as well.
Research has shown, however, that the administrative law courts exer-
cise this competence only sparingly.4 As a general rule, the administrative 
law court that is required to render an opinion on disputed facts does not 
institute its own investigation. A judicial request addressed to the parties to 
submit additional proof for their assertions is also quite exceptional. These 
findings may be explained in part on the basis of practical arguments. A 
great deal of information is gathered in the context of the preparation of the 
contested decision by the administrative authority. The evidence already 
available will frequently be sufficient to allow the court to render an opinion 
on the facts. Moreover, the planning of cases does not, as a general rule, take 
account of the possibility that the case may be suspended due to the neces-
sity of a further investigation of the facts.5 
In addition, there is a more principled argument. Case law of various 
Dutch administrative law courts clearly shows that judges believe it is prima-
rily up to the administrative authority to investigate the facts. This view is 
in line with Article :2 of the GALA, in which the administrative authority 
is instructed to gather all relevant information in preparing a decision.6 If it 
turns out in the process that the administrative authority has failed to do so 
properly, the court invariably considers this to be an argument not to carry 
out its own investigation. The administrative law courts do not consider it to 
be their task to remedy the administrative authority’s defective investigation 
of the facts.7 Because the review against Article :2 of the GALA is usually 
leading, the courts primarily answer the question whether the administra-
tive authority has carried out a careful investigation of the facts. The judicial 
review of the fact-finding concentrates mainly on the question whether the 
procedure has been careful and not whether the facts found are correct in 
the courts’ opinion. 
4  T. Barkhuysen, L.J.A. Damen et al., Feitenvaststelling in beroep, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2007, p. 99 et seq.
5  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 2.
6  See for an overall view on the obligations arising from Article :2 GALA in a European 
law perspective: Jan H. Jans, ‘The Consequential Effect of European Law in Respect of the 
Requirement of Due Care’, [2007] REALaw, p. 6-72.
7  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 6 et seq.
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Another complication is that new evidence is not always accepted. 
Especially when the interested party bore the burden of proof when apply-
ing for a decision, it is not always allowed to supply new evidence in the 
judicial procedure. If an administrative law judge would evaluate this piece 
of evidence, he might interfere with the power of the executive. After all a 
judge is not permitted to issue an executive decision.
The described interpretation of the courts’ duty is recognised particularly 
in the case law of the Raad van State (Administrative Law Division of the 
Council of State).8 9
The administrative law courts’ role in fact-finding has received a great 
deal of attention in academic literature. There is an acute awareness of the 
tension between the rule of law and the administration of justice on the 
basis of substantive truth on the one hand, and the courts’ limited role in a 
state based on the separation of powers on the other hand.0 There are differ-
ing opinions whether the administration may have discretion when assess-
ing facts. As will be seen in section five, various arguments in this Dutch 
debate are also put forward when discussing the intensity of review of facts 
in Community law. 
Traditionally, most academics are of the opinion that an administrative 
authority lacks discretion in the fact-finding process and that administrative 
law courts can fully review the facts. The courts bear their own responsibil-
ity for establishing the facts in such a manner that these correspond with 
the substantive truth as much as possible. If it turns out in the process that 
the facts are different from those established in the administrative authori-
ty’s decision, the decision cannot be regarded as lawful. For the purposes 
of effective legal protection, the courts must be able to form their own 
opinion about the facts. Under certain circumstances discretion in inter-
8  The Raad van State is the highest national administrative law court charged with the 
general jurisdiction in administrative law cases in the Netherlands. It deals with both ques-
tions of law and of fact. There are also several specialized administrative law courts. See 
www.rechtspraak.nl/information+in+english. The College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 
(Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal) rules on disputes in the area of social-economic 
administrative law, e.g. on appeals in competition law.
9  E.J. Daalder & M. Schreuder-Vlasblom, ‘Balanceren boven nul’, [2000] NTB, p. 24-22; 
Y.E. Schuurmans, Bewijslastverdeling in het bestuursrecht. Zorgvuldigheid en bewijsvoering bij 
beschikkingen (PhD thesis Amsterdam, VU), Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 27-276; R.J.G.M. 
Widdershoven, ‘De ABRS en de toetsing aan het EG-recht’, in: W. den Ouden (ed.), Staats-
steun en de Nederlandse rechter    , Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 40-4.
0  See on the position of discretion between the principles of the rule of law and the separa-
tion of powers: Roberto Caranta, ‘On Discretion’, in: Sacha Prechal & Bert van Roermund 
(eds.), The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008, p. 85-25.
  R.H. de Bock, ‘Waarheidsvinding in het bestuursrecht’, in: Het procesrecht en de waarheids-
vinding (NVvP-reeks ), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 200, p. 44; J.E.M. Polak 
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pretation may extend to the question how facts are to be appreciated in the 
light of a statutory provision, but, as a general rule, it does not relate to the 
question whether specific facts have occurred. ‘There is no such thing as 
a specific margin within which a fact is or is not true and the administra-
tive authority is free to choose. It should be possible to objectify fact-finding 
and the administrative authority and the court should arrive at the same 
assessment.’2 In addition, the courts’ own responsibility to establish facts is 
advocated on the basis of arguments such as the persuasiveness of judicial 
decisions and the courts’ authority. 
Counterarguments in favour of interpreting the administrative law 
courts’ task as a limited one are advanced in academic literature as well. 
According to this line of reasoning, the courts’ task is not to establish the 
facts themselves but to assess the lawfulness and care of the fact-find-
ing process underlying the relevant decision. A court that assesses (new) 
evidence itself runs the risk of encroaching upon the administrative authori-
ty’s law-creating power. If evidence was necessary to establish any right of 
the interested party or the administrative authority, the court cannot itself 
grant the relevant right on the basis of evidence acquired at a later date.4 
Further, it is pointed out that the administrative authority usually has more 
expertise for establishing facts. This argument is valid mainly where techni-
cal, medical, economic or a different kind of expertise is needed for finding 
facts. One could argue that in the case of complex facts of this kind, the 
administrative authority makes various normative and policy-based choices 
that must be respected by the court. Such normative and policy-based 
choices may lie in the assessment of the appropriate method of investigation 
of the facts, the admissibility and valuation of the alternative evidence and in 
the question whether the evidence gathered is sufficiently persuasive for the 
exercise of power. In that case, the courts should be permitted to review the 
administration’s fact-finding only in terms of reasonableness.5 This limited 
test of reasonableness is also advocated for cases where it is inherently diffi-
cult to objectify the facts, as in asylum cases. If there is no ‘hard’ evidence 
but the administrative authority is prepared to establish a right in the event 
of a specific (un)certainty percentage, balancing of interests may be part of 
the fact-finding process. The courts should respect this policy assessment, 
which means that they cannot simply substitute their opinion on the facts 
et al., De toekomst van de rechtsbescherming tegen de overheid, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2004, p. 2 et seq.
2  Schuurmans (2005), p. 265-266.
  De Bock (200), p. 45.
4  Daalder & Schreuder-Vlasblom (2000), p. 24-22 and M. Schreuder-Vlasblom, Rechtsbe-
scherming en bestuurlijke voorprocedure   , Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 7.
5  M.A. Heldeweg, Normstelling en expertise. Waarborgen voor technische deskundigheid in het 
bijzonder bij vergunningverlening in het milieurecht, Den Haag: Sdu Juridische uitgevers 
99, p. 298-02. Schuurmans (2005), par. 6.4.
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for the administration’s opinion on the facts.6 Apart from these dogmatic 
aspects, more practical arguments play a role too. Court proceedings are less 
suitable for a detailed investigation into the facts than the decision-making 
process. The investigation of the facts could well jeopardise the requirement 
of dispute resolution within a reasonable period.7
The view that the courts should confine themselves to applying the test 
of reasonableness with respect to the administration’s fact-finding makes 
heavy demands on the care and completeness of the investigation of the 
facts carried out by the administrative authority. According to this view, it 
is fitting to emphasize and accurately develop the requirements to be placed 
on the administration’s fact-finding. This may include proper assistance to 
be provided by the administrative authority for the interested party in the 
context of the provision of proof; extensive possibilities for a debate on the 
facts in the adjudication process and strict requirements with respect to 
the statement of reasons underlying the decision. The case law of the Raad 
van State reveals – although not very consistently or accurately 8− such an 
emphasis on the duty of due care with respect to the administrative fact-find-
ing procedure.9 Whether Dutch administrative law courts, the Raad van 
State included, in practice do apply a test of reasonableness when reviewing 
the facts is discussed in the next section.
 3 The Intensity of the Dutch Duty of Due Care Test 
It is difficult to analyse the intensity of the duty of due care 
test in actual cases on the basis of court decisions. Does scrunity of the care 
of the fact-finding procedure mean that the court no longer considers the 
accuracy of the fact-finding? Does the administrative authority have some 
latitude when it comes to establishing the facts? These questions are diffi-
cult to answer, because the court decision usually fails to provide an answer 
in explicit terms. The answer cannot usually be inferred implicitly either, 
because the statement of reasons underlying the court’s opinion on the 
fact-finding is often quite limited. It is not exceptional if the court’s decision 
solely states that ‘the interested party failed to show that…’. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of decisions in which the courts render 
an explicit opinion on the required intensity of review in relation to the facts. 
In such cases, the decision is usually the result of an explicit invocation of 
discretion in interpretation by the administrative authority or a reaction to 
the intensity of review applied by the first-instance court. The general rule 
apparent from these decisions is that the courts review the fact-finding in 
6  Schreuder-Vlasblom (2006), p. 72.
7  Widdershoven (2005), p. 42.
8  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 28.
9  Schuurmans (2005), chapters 4 and 5.
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full and do not confine themselves to determining whether the administra-
tive authority could have reasonably established the facts in the way it did.20 
The courts make exceptions to this general rule, however. With respect to 
asylum law, the Raad van State has ruled that the courts may not substitute 
their own assessment of the facts for the administration’s assessment.2 In 
such cases, the courts must administer a limited test. If an administrative 
authority has established the facts according to a fixed evidence policy, the 
relevant case law shows that the courts hardly ever correct this fact-finding. 
Their test is usually confined to the question whether the evidence policy is 
supported by an objective statement of reasons.22 The arguments advocated 
in the literature for reviewing fact-finding in a limited way – expertise and a 
lack of ‘hard’ evidence2 − are sometimes recognised in the relevant case law. 
These few decisions on intensity of review, however, do not reveal how 
the administrative law courts carry out their review in practice. The limited 
statement of reasons in court decisions forms an obstacle in ascertaining 
the intensity of review. Often it remains unclear what arguments and what 
means of proof the parties have advanced. Further, court decisions often 
lack the explicit weighing of arguments and means of proof by the court. As 
a result, the reader of a decision does not know how concretely the adminis-
tration’s fact-finding has been challenged and why the court disregarded the 
interested party’s argument. In that case, it is impossible to determine how 
strictly the court reviews the administrative authority’s fact-finding efforts. 
Empirical research has revealed some data.24 These courts of first instance 
render a negative opinion on the soundness of the fact-finding process in 
28% of the cases where the administration’s fact-finding is in dispute. The 
courts usually formulate their opinion on the facts in a cautious manner. 
They confine themselves to concluding that the administrative authority has 
investigated the facts insufficiently or has failed to state sufficient reasons 
for the decision, without being very precise about the kind of lack in the 
factual assessment. This means that in the case of a negative opinion, the 
courts allow the administrative authority room to arrive at the same fact-
finding in four out of five cases. Thus, the administrative law courts render a 
final opinion on the facts in very few cases indeed. 
20  Rechtbank Rotterdam (District Court Rotterdam) 20 September 2000, AB 200, 9; Raad 
van State 5 July 996, AB 996, 44; Centrale Raad van Beroep 7 September 2000, TAR 
2000, 47; Centrale Raad van Beroep (Central Appeals Tribunal) 4 November 2002, TAR 
200, 77; College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 2 September 2006, JB 2006, 297.
2  For example see Raad van State 27 January 200, AB 200, 286.
22  Schuurmans (2005), par. 5.2.2 and 6.4.4.
2  See the former section.
24  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 290.
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 4  The National Administrative Law Courts and the 
Required Intensity of Review of the Facts Viewed 
from the EC Law Perspective 
In several Dutch publications, attention has been focused on 
the method of review adopted mainly by the Raad van State as viewed from 
the EC law perspective.25 The national court that assesses whether admin-
istrative decisions are in accordance with EC law may do so in a variety of 
manners.26 The Raad van State usually reviews these decisions on the basis 
of the principles of proper administrative procedure as well. In that case, 
the Raad van State itself does not assess whether the disputed decision is in 
accordance with EC law (specific review), but assesses whether in preparing 
the decision, the administrative authority has examined its conformity with 
EC law to a sufficient extent. If this examination is found to be insufficient, 
the decision is usually annulled because of a violation of the principle of due 
care and the duty to state reasons. If the court confines its work to this test, 
it hardly needs to investigate the facts itself. The question arises, however, 
whether this kind of formal test is consistent with the national court’s duties 
as Community court. Does it offer private individuals sufficient legal protec-
tion, thus allowing them to effectuate their rights under EC law and does it 
check whether the administration has complied with EC law to a sufficient 
extent? 
In specific cases EC law itself may define rules on evidence and fact-
finding by means of regulations and directives to be observed by the court 
hearing the action.27 The main rule, however, is that a Member State has 
procedural autonomy and may adopt its own procedures. National proce-
dural law must, however, satisfy the well-known requirements of equality 
and effectiveness, as required by the Rewe doctrine.28 The question whether 
a duty of due care test with respect to fact-finding within the meaning of 
Article :2 of the GALA satisfies these requirements cannot be answered 
with absolute certainty. This issue has not yet been referred to the ECJ 
25  Barkhuysen & Damen et al. (2007), p. 9-4; M.J. Jacobs & W. den Ouden, ‘De toetsing 
getoetst. De bestuursrechter en het EG-recht inzake staatssteun’, in: W. den Ouden (ed.), 
Staatssteun en de Nederlandse rechter, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p -8; J.H. Jans, Doorgescho-
ten? Enkele opmerkingen over de gevolgen van de Europeanisering van het bestuursrecht voor de 
grondslagen van de bestuursrechtspraak, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005, p. 7-22; 
Widdershoven (2005) and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, ‘De Europese rol van de nationale 
rechter: rechtsbeschermer of controleur?’, in: A.W. Heringa et al. (eds.), Het bestuursrecht 
beschermd: liber amicorum F.A.M. Stroink, Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers 2006, p. 57-69.
26  J.H. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2002, p. 
28-5.
27  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 28 et seq.
28  Case /76 Rewe [976] ECR 989.
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as a preliminary question. In Dutch literature the following answer can 
be found. In Europeanisation of Public Law, the Dutch authors reach the 
conclusion that the review of a decision on the basis of the principle of due 
care is not inconsistent with EC law. They infer from the Upjohn case to be 
discussed below that the ECJ allows the Member States much freedom and 
that any form of ‘normal’ review is to be regarded as permissible.29 Widders-
hoven endorses this conclusion elsewhere, albeit in more cautious terms.         0 
In his opinion, the test against the principle of due care satisfies the require-
ments of equality and effectiveness, because in purely national administra-
tive proceedings, the Raad van State frequently tests decisions against the 
principle of due care, which means that the equality requirement is satisfied. 
Nor does he believe that the effectiveness-principle has been violated. After 
the annulment on the basis of the principle of due care, the administrative 
authority must prepare and adopt a decision that does satisfy the relevant EC 
law standards. It is true that this may be more cumbersome than obtaining 
a definitive decision on the compliance with EC law, but one cannot say that 
the exercise of rights derived from EC law is rendered extremely difficult 
or impossible. Jans’ application of the Rewe doctrine leads to a somewhat 
different result. He does not rule out that the equality principle is violated if 
the Raad van State systematically avoids the application of a substantive test 
against EC law. Decisions that are fully based on national law are sometimes 
tested substantively for compatibility with national rules of a higher rank. In 
the context of the principle of effectiveness, he observes that the test against 
the principle of due care is more unfavourable in terms of effective imple-
mentation of EC law than specific review. For this reason, he takes the view 
that the national court must administer a substantive test against European 
law as much as possible, but in doing so, he does not seem to conclude that 
there is a true legal duty. In general, it is assumed in Dutch literature that 
the administrative law courts may limit their EC law check to a test designed 
to ascertain whether the administrative authority has carefully examined 
whether the decision is consistent with EC law. 
Incidentally, this ‘cautious’ conclusion is not drawn with respect to 
administrative law as a whole. In any case, state aid law requires a different 
approach. If an interested party asserts that a decision amounts to unlaw-
ful state aid, the test against the principle of due care would not satisfy the 
relevant requirement. This method of review is said to be inconsistent with 
the purpose and tenor of this part of EC law. To ensure compliance with the 
third paragraph of Article 88 EC, the national administrative law courts are 
required to establish whether the ‘standstill’ obligation has been violated. As 
29  J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of Public Law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2007, 
p. 94.
0  Widdershoven (2005).
  Jans (2005), p. 2 and 22.
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a general rule, they must then render a final opinion (also on the facts) on 
the question whether there is any unlawful state aid.2
Whether the Dutch standard of review of facts in competition cases is in 
accordance with EC law is hardly discussed. The College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven has tailored its method of review to the review applied by the 
Community courts, as in cases like Tetra Laval, which will be discussed in 
section five.
The above views on the national courts’ method of review are based to a 
great extent on the Upjohn case.4 This decision is of special interest to this 
contribution, because it deals with the question what test the national court 
must apply in reviewing the facts.
Upjohn took legal action against a decision to revoke all marketing 
authorisations relating to the drug Triazolam. It follows from Directive 
65/65/EEC that an authorisation of a medicinal product should be revoked 
where that product proves to be harmful. The potential harmful effect of 
Triazolam was discovered when a middle-aged woman killed her mother 
under the influence of the drug. In national proceedings, a discussion began 
about the question how the court should review the determination that the 
drug is harmful. The English Court of Appeal submitted a preliminary 
question on this issue. Upjohn argued that the directive and EC law in 
general require that the national court should be able to review the correct-
ness of the decision, both with respect to the facts and the law, on the 
ground of a new and full assessment. On the other hand, the administrative 
authority asserted that it was the only national body competent to take deci-
sions concerning the production and marketing of medicinal products and 
that the court could not substitute its opinion for that of the authority. 
The ECJ does not endorse Upjohn’s argument. The directive does not lay 
down detailed rules for the exercise of judicial review of revocation deci-
sions. In that case, it is up to the Member State itself to organise the judicial 
review required, provided that the equality and effectiveness principles are 
complied with. The effectiveness principle does not require that the national 
court should be able to substitute its assessment of the facts, particularly 
scientific proof, for that of the administrative authority. The ECJ holds as 
follows:
‘33 As regards decisions revoking marketing authorisations taken by the 
competent national authorities following complex assessments in the medico-
2  P.C. Adriaanse, Handhaving van EG-recht in situaties van onrechtmatige staatssteun (PhD 
thesis Amsterdam, VU), Deventer: Kluwer 2006, p. 259-26; Jacobs & Den Ouden (2005), 
p. 7-8. See otherwise Widdershoven (2005), p. 50-54.
  College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 28 November 2006, AB 2007, 6 and Actualiteiten 
Mededingingsrecht 2007, p. 5-44. See L.E.J. Korstens & M. van Wanroij, Nederlands mede-
dingingsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 222-224.
4  Case C-20/97 Upjohn II [999] ECR I-6927.
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pharmacological field, it does not appear that the only appropriate means 
of preventing the exercise of rights conferred by Community law from being 
rendered virtually impossible or excessively difficult would be a procedure 
for judicial review of national decisions revoking marketing authorisations, 
empowering the competent national courts and tribunals to substitute their 
assessment of the facts and, in particular, of the scientific evidence relied on 
in support of the revocation decision for the assessment made by the national 
authorities competent to revoke such authorisations.
34. According to the Court’s case-law, where a Community authority is 
called upon, in the performance of its duties, to make complex assessments, 
it enjoys a wide measure of discretion, the exercise of which is subject to a 
limited judicial review in the course of which the Community judicature may 
not substitute its assessment of the facts for the assessment made by the 
authority concerned. Thus, in such cases, the Community judicature must 
restrict itself to examining the accuracy of the findings of fact and law made 
by the authority concerned and to verifying, in particular, that the action taken 
by that authority is not vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers and 
that it did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion (see, in particular, 
Joined Cases /4 and /4 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1] 
ECR 2, Case / Balkan-Import Export v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof 
[1] ECR 1, paragraph , Case /2 Øhrgaard and Delvaux v Commission 
[13] ECR 23, paragraph 14, Case C-22/1 Matra v Commission [13] ECR 
I-3203, paragraphs 24 and 2, and Case C-1/ National Farmers’ Union and 
Others [1] ECR I-2211, paragraph 3).’ 
With the Upjohn ruling, it was accepted that under certain circumstances a 
limited national judicial test of the fact-finding is sufficient. If the adminis-
trative authority has to make complex factual assessments the national court 
is not required to render its own opinion on the facts. This ruling answered 
a fairly specific question into the review of decisions adopted on the basis of 
a complicated fact-finding process in cases where the administrative author-
ity had discretion. The ECJ issued some more instructions, however, about 
the national test required. It established a direct link with its own review in 
EC cases:5 
5  Cf. G. de Búrca & Á. Ryall, ‘The ECJ and Judicial Review of National Administrative Proce-
dure in the field of EIA’, in: Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Europeanisation of Administrative Law. 
Transforming national decision-making procedures, Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth 2002, p. 
54 et seq.; Peter Oliver, ‘The Standard of Review of Commission Merger Decisions: Life 
after “Tetra Laval”’, in: Martin Johansson et al. (eds.), Liber amicorum in honour of Sven 
Norberg: A European for all seasons, Bruxelles: Bruylant 2006, p. 409 and 45; T. Tridimas, 
The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, p. 448 and 449; A. 
Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2000, p. 7 et seq. Peter Oliver explicitly suggests (p. 409) that the standard of review 
expressed in Upjohn is of the same nature as the standard of review in merger decisions, 
which will be discussed in the next section.
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‘3 Consequently, Community law does not require the Member States to 
establish a procedure for judicial review of national decisions revoking market-
ing authorisations, taken pursuant to Directive / and in the exercise 
of complex assessments, which involves a more extensive review than that 
carried out by the Court in similar cases.’
Accordingly, the national court cannot be required to apply a method of 
review that is more intensive than the test applied by the Community courts. 
This means that the Community courts’ own test has a normative function. 
Below, this fact will be addressed in greater detail. If we reach the conclu-
sion that the Raad van State administers the same or a more intensive test 
than the one applied by the Community courts, we know that it will gene-
rally pass the EC law test. If the test administered by the Raad van State falls 
below this level, vigilance is required. In that case, the national court should 
take heed of the safeguards used by the Community courts in their review.6
 5 The Intensity of Review of Facts in Direct Appeal
 5. Introduction
Below, the manner in which the Community courts review 
facts in direct appeals will be addressed. The preliminary reference proce-
dure will be disregarded in this context, because in this procedure the Com-
munity court’s task is somewhat different as far as the facts are concerned. 
In this procedure the national court is offered an explanation of substantive 
EC law in a case where the facts of the dispute have already been established 
by that national court. In that case, the Community court does not review 
the fact-finding by an administrative authority but renders a decision on the 
basis of the facts as established in the national judicial proceedings. 
In the description of the review of facts in direct appeals, the CFI occu-
pies an important position. As a general rule, the CFI now decides on direct 
appeals in the first instance. If subsequently an appeal is filed with the ECJ, 
the latter deals only with questions of law.7 Thus, the CFI has exclusive 
jurisdiction to find the facts and the ECJ does not render any opinion on the 
assessment and appraisal of facts, save where the clear sense of the evidence 
is distorted.8 Whether the CFI has imposed too high a standard of reason-
6  Caranta (2008) describes the way in which the different legal traditions have influenced the 
concept of discretion of the Community courts.
7  Art. 225, para.  EC. See K.P.E. Lasok & T. Millet, Judicial Control in the EU: procedures and 
principles, Richmond: Richmond Law & Tax 2004, p. 88. 
8  Case C-90-95P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v. Commission [999] ECR I-769, at para. 29; 
Case C-88/96P Commission v. V [997] ECR I-656 at para. 24; Joined Cases C-204/00P, C-
205/00P, C-27/00P and C-29/00P Aalborg Portland A/S and Others v. Commission [2004] 
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ing and standard of proof, whether it has applied the correct criteria in its 
appraisal of the facts and the evidence and whether it has applied the right 
intensity of review are all questions of law, though; the required standard of 
review arises from the law.
The ECJ and the CFI, which are required to ensure the correct applica-
tion of EC law, have as their duty to review the facts. The lawful application 
of EC law can be ensured only if the law is applied with respect to accurate 
facts. This principle does not by definition result in an active court. No more 
than the Dutch administrative law courts will the Community courts initiate 
an investigation into the facts on their own initiative; it is primarily up to the 
parties to give satisfactory proof for their assertions. The assertion should be 
substantiated to a sufficient degree before the court starts an investigation 
into the facts.9 
The Community courts’ activities have developed to a certain extent. 
When the ECJ still functioned as the sole court in the case of direct appeals, 
the investigation into the facts was limited. It hardly ever exercised its inves-
tigative powers.40 The CFI is quite different in this respect. It engages in 
lengthy considerations concerning the findings of fact and frequently refers 
to information it received during hearings or from written questions.4 This 
cultural shift is intentional. One of the reasons for forming the CFI was the 
need for a more intensive review of the assessment of the facts, particularly 
in cases involving complex facts.42 This need was fed by the Commission’s 
overly strong institutional position. In the course of time, people began to 
level criticism at the Commission’s position as ‘police officer, prosecutor and 
judge’ all in one, caused, inter alia, by the ECJ’s restrained review of fact-
finding.4 
The question how the court should deal with the administration’s fact-
finding constitutes an explicit point of discussion also in proceedings follow-
ing a direct appeal. Does the Community court have the right to substitute 
its own opinion on the facts for the Commission’s opinion? Does it have the 
right to value all relevant evidence itself? Does the Community court also 
ECR I-2 at para. 47 to 50; Case C-40/04P Sumitomo Metal Industries v. Commission [2007] 
ECR I-729, at para. 8 to 40.
9  Mark Brealey, ‘The Burden of Proof before the European Court’, ELRev. 985, vol. 0, p. 250-
25; Lasok & Millet (2004), p. 22 and 247; K. Lenaerts, D. Arts & I. Maselis, Procedural Law 
of the European Union, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006, p. 557; G. Ress, ‘Fact-finding at the 
European Court of Justice’, in: R.B. Lillich (ed.), Fact-finding before International Tribunals, 
New York: Transnational Publishers 992, p. 8.
40  Ress (992), p. 8. He describes the outcome of a study conducted in 982: in almost 0 
years after the ECJ came into existence, it had heard only 20 witnesses in 28 cases and had 
appointed only  experts in 8 cases.
4  See for example the cases of Pfizer and Tetra Laval to be discussed below.
42  Lenaerts, Arts & Maselis (2006), p. 5.
4  See, among others, Ress (992), p. 92 for this criticism.
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review on the basis of a duty of due care standard and, if so, how is this stan-
dard applied? The beginning of an answer will be given below.44 Naturally, 
the specific rules of evidence and the intensity of review for each substan-
tive branch of law may vary.45 The nature of these differences is primarily 
a question of European substantive law, which will not be addressed in this 
contribution. 
 5.2 The Standard of Review of Facts
It is undisputed that statutory interpretation is the domain 
of the court. The Community courts provide the ultimate interpretation of 
Community law. It is more difficult to answer the question whose domain 
the assessment of facts is. Fact-finding will invariably be part of the admin-
istration’s decision-making. As far as public-law procedures are concerned, 
the court nearly always refrains from repeating the fact-finding process but, 
instead, reviews the fact-finding procedure.46 If the correctness of the facts 
is in dispute, it is in general acknowledged that the judge should apply a full 
review. ‘Either a fact is correct or it is not.’47 Things get complicated however 
when the review of a factual appreciation is in dispute, which may be part 
of a discretionary power. A limited review of the administration’s factual 
appreciation may then be appropriate. Sometimes it is even hardly possible 
to make a clear distinction between fact and appreciation. For example, the 
quantification of particular primary facts may inevitable be the result of an 
intellectual construction.48
Above, it was already stated that the ECJ was not very active in scru-
tinizing the fact-finding process. It nearly always exercised ‘judicial self-
restraint’.49 In a contribution from 992, Ress described this restraint in 
relation to the action for annulment and to anti-dumping cases. He explains 
the restrained review of the facts partly on the basis of treaty provisions,50 
partly on the basis of the doctrine of the separation of powers and partly 
on the basis of the excessive workload of the ECJ. In the end, the degree of 
intensity of the review of facts is determined by the complexity of the facts at 
issue:
44  In this respect I have benefited greatly from Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2006, Chapter : ‘Law, Fact and Discretion’, p. 429-48.
45  Cf. De Búrca & Ryall (2002), p. 59.
46  Cf. D. Baily, ‘Scope of Judicial Review under Article 8 EC’, [2004] CMLRev. , p. 0.
47  Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case 
Law of the Community Courts’, [2005] European Competition Journal, p. 5.
48  Cf. Hubert Legal, ‘Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EU Competition 
Law’,  [2006] Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (vol. 2), p. 4.
49  Ress (992), p. 87.
50  Especially Article  ECSC.
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‘The more complex the underlying facts are, the more difficult it is to label 
a decision objectively wrong, i.e., just review a decision judicially instead of 
overtaking the role as decisionmaker, a role which belongs to the executive 
branch.’1
‘Whenever the borderline between facts and law becomes unclear, the court 
withdraws and leaves the facts as far as possible to other institutions.’2
Accordingly, the ECJ generally exercised restraint in reviewing the Commis-
sion’s assessment of the facts. In specific cases, it even recognised the test 
of reasonableness. In some policy areas, the Community institution has 
wide discretionary power, for example, in the field of agricultural policy or 
in the field of protective measures and commercial policy. This discretion-
ary power need not be limited to the interpretation of factual standards and 
policy choices in relation to, for example, the objectives to be pursued or the 
means that are considered suitable. If the Community institution is to make 
a complicated assessment on facts, the administrative authority’s discretion 
also relates to a certain extent to fact-finding. In this respect the ECJ uses 
terms like discretion in relation to ‘findings of the basic facts’ or the ‘estab-
lishment of the factual basis of the action’. 
‘When the implementation by the Council of the agricultural policy of the 
Community involves the need to evaluate a complex economic situation, the 
discretion which it has does not apply exclusively to the nature and scope of 
the measures to be taken but also to some extent tot the findings of the basic 
facts inasmuch as, in particular, it is open to the Council to rely if necessary 
on general findings. In reviewing the exercise of such a power the court must 
confine itself to examining whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes 
a misuse of power or whether the authority in question did not clearly exceed 
the bounds of its discretion.’3
An assessment of the facts is complex, for example, where complicated 
economic or social assessments must be made, or where an assessment is 
otherwise based on specific scientific data. Under what circumstances, for 
example, is there a case of ‘state aid’ or a ‘serious public health risk’? The 
Community courts may not substitute their own assessment of the facts for 
the Community institution’s assessment in the case of complex facts. EC law 
5  Ress (992), p. 87.
52  Ress (992), p. 9.
5  Case C-8/79 Roquette frères v. Council [980] ECR , at para. 25. Cf. Case C-97/80-
200/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle a.o. v. Council and Commission [98] ECR 2, at para. 
7; Case C-27/95 Bakers of Nalisea [997] ECR I-847, at para. 2, Case C-4/96 NIFPO and 
Northern Ireland Fishermen’s Federation v. Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland 
[998] ECR I-68, at para. 4 and 42; Case T-/99 Pfizer Animal Health v. Council [2002] 
ECR II-96, at para. 68.
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has assigned this task to the administration. Craig describes this ‘old’ line 
in EC case law. He is of the opinion that it is not the treaty text that forms 
an obstacle to more intensive review, but explains this restraint primarily 
by referring to efficiency considerations. He argues that intensive review 
of fact-finding is time-consuming and may induce parties ‘to second-guess 
evaluations’. In addition, the ECJ was the only court that was able to check 
the validity of the acts performed by the Community institutions, as a result 
of which overburdening of the ECJ was a real danger.54 
If we compare the above line with the Dutch case law of the Raad van 
State and with the view taken by the advocates of limited judicial review,55 we 
can observe clear parallels. The judicial task of rendering a final opinion on 
complex facts does not fit into the system of the separation of powers. Policy 
aspects may be part of the fact-finding process and the administration is 
responsible for these assessments. And in the Dutch national system, too, 
attention is paid to procedural efficiency and the risk of overburdening the 
court. Yet, there is a clear difference. The explicit recognition that admin-
istrative discretion may extend to ‘findings of the basic facts’ cannot, apart 
from cases in asylum law, be found in the Dutch case law, as opposed to EC 
law.
After the description of this ‘old’ line, Craig shows on the basis of a thor-
ough case law analysis that the test of reasonableness with respect to facts 
became more intensive in the course of time.56 He argues that this develop-
ment was most apparent in competition law cases under the guidance of the 
CFI, but he also perceives this tendency in the case law relating to common 
policies, state aid and structural funds.57 ‘It is clear that while retaining the 
established grounds of review the Community courts, and more especially 
the CFI, have been applying these with greater intensity than hitherto. 
This is, as will be seen later in the discussion, a common phenomenon in 
national legal systems.’58 Biondi and Harmer describe an increased intensity 
of review exercised over Community measures in environmental law and an 
increased attention for scientific evidence.59 The Community courts still use 
the same words for defining their restrained review: manifest error, abuse of 
power, and manifestly excessive use of administrative powers. Even so, the 
54  Craig (2006), p. 49-446.
55  See section 2 and .
56  Craig (2006), p. 446-464. Cf. Rostane Mehdi, ‘La preuve devant les juridictions commu-
nautaires’, in: Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Jean-Marc Sorel (eds.), La preuve devant les juridictions 
internationals, Paris: Pedone 2007, p. 76-8 and the commentary of Hubert Legal, p. 86-
87.
57  Craig (2006), p. 457-462.
58  Craig (2006), p. 446.
59  Andrea Biondi & Katherine Hamer, ‘Scientific Evidence and the European Judiciary’, in: A. 
Biondi et al. (eds.), Scientific Evidence in European Environmental Rule-making, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 200, par. 2..
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intensity of the test seems to have increased, because the courts are more 
readily prepared to accept a ‘manifest error’.
It would be beyond the scope of this contribution to deal with the wide 
variety of case law discussed by Craig in detail. After a study of a portion 
of this case law, I will pinpoint some aspects of the manner in which the 
Community courts review the factual assessments, ‘even’ where this test is 
of a restrained nature. Two cases, to wit Pfizer and Tetra Laval, demonstrate 
the potential degree of detail of a test of reasonableness. The following 
discussion of the relevant case law does not pretend to give a general picture 
of the Community courts’ review of the facts.60 This description is meant 
to show that the relevant EC case law includes elements that may be used to 
give substance to a national ‘duty of due care or duty to state reasons test’ in 
relation to fact-finding. These review aspects may well be a source of inspira-
tion for the Dutch administrative law courts where these test the administra-
tion’s fact-finding against Article :2 of the GALA. In addition, the case law 
shows that intensive review of the fact-finding procedure and review whether 
the facts established are in accordance with the truth need not be diametri-
cally opposed to each other as review concepts, which is regularly done in 
Dutch academic literature. 
 5.  The Cases of Pfizer and Tetra Laval: An Operation of the 
Standard of Review of Facts
In the Pfizer case, the CFI pays detailed attention to the 
review of the assessment of the facts.6 Pfizer instituted legal proceedings in 
connection with the adoption of a regulation under which a specific antibi-
otic was prohibited as an additive in animal feeds. The measure was taken 
for fear of the risk that specific drugs could become ineffective for human 
use as a result of the use of a specific antibiotic (virigniamycin). The parties 
agree that there was no scientific proof for the development for such resist-
ance at the time of the adoption of the regulation. Nevertheless, the Council 
took the disputed measure on the basis of the precautionary principle. The 
relevant EC case law shows that this kind of preventive measure cannot be 
based on a purely hypothetical approach to the risk. The risk of transfer and 
resistance, although the reality and extent thereof cannot be fully demon-
strated by conclusive scientific evidence, should be supported by sufficient 
scientific data.62 The CFI divides its own factual test of the public health risk 
into two stages: first, it reviews whether the findings of fact were correct and 
subsequently it reviews whether the appreciation of the facts exceeded the 
60  Though this jurisprudence does illustrate that the judicial review of facts has been intensi-
fied.
6  Case T-/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-05.
62  Pfizer, at para. 4 and 44.
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bounds of discretion.6 The Community institution has these two tasks in 
assessing health risks as well. The CFI states that political considerations 
may play a role only in respect of the appreciation of the facts, e.g. the ques-
tion of the risk level that is deemed acceptable.64 
Accordingly, the CFI states explicitly what test it must administer itself. 
For the Dutch situation this is of interest, because the Raad van State 
hardly does this explicitly. Because the Community institution must make 
a complicated assessment, its discretion extends to a certain degree to the 
factual basis of its action. The CFI will then administer the above-mentioned 
test of reasonableness, emphasizing that if it is difficult to establish facts 
objectively, the procedural guarantees are of even greater importance (for 
more details, see section six). Those guarantees include, in particular, the 
duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all 
the relevant aspects of the individual case. A fact-finding based on scientific 
information should be founded on principles like ‘excellence, transparency 
and independence’. These important procedural guarantees must ensure the 
scientific objectivity.65 The CFI by no means confines itself to the conclusion 
that the Community institution has discretion in interpretation and that 
insufficient proof has been submitted that its opinion was manifestly erro-
neous. Despite the limited nature of the test, the CFI specifies the elements 
of its test in more detail. The requirements arising from the principles of 
‘excellence, transparency and independency’ that the administration should 
satisfy are defined in concrete terms. For example, the CFI examines to what 
extent the Community institution is bound to seek expert advice and what 
responsibilities have been entrusted to the Community institution. (For 
example, the Community institution must prepare the factual questions 
which the experts need to answer. Furthermore it has to asses the probative 
value of the report, in which context it must examine whether the reasoning 
of the advice is full, consistent and relevant. The administration may deviate 
from the advice or use only part thereof, as it is responsible for the exercise 
of public authority. The advisory body cannot take over this responsibility, 
because it bears only scientific and no political responsibility.)66 Further, 
the CFI specifies what requirements should be placed on the statement of 
reasons underlying the decision if the administration decides to deviate from 
the advice. (The Community institution must provide specific reasons that 
are geared towards the assessment included in the advice and that should be 
of at least the same scientific level as the advice itself. The reasons should be 
based on an appropriate, accurate and impartial analysis of all the relevant 
aspects of the individual case, which include the reasoning on which the 
6  Pfizer, at para. 28.
64  Pfizer, at para. 50.
65  Pfizer, at para. 72.
66  Pfizer, at para. 98 and 20.
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advisory body based the findings in its opinion.)67 The CFI also specifies 
what body is to be regarded as an expert body and what legitimizes this 
body. (For example, the scientific committee’s opinion cannot be replaced 
by an opinion of the permanent committee, because – despite the members’ 
professional ability – it must be considered a political body representing the 
Member States that is not independent.)68 
After it has drawn the conclusion that the Community institution did not 
make any errors in establishing the relevant facts, the CFI assesses whether 
the institution could reasonably have rendered the opinion that the antibiotic 
constitutes a public health risk. The CFI accurately ascertains what conclu-
sions can be based or cannot be based on the relevant expert advice, on 
the basis of the arguments put forward. However, it will not deal with the 
substantive accuracy of this scientific advice. This is the core of the test of 
reasonableness administered by the CFI:
‘It is not for the Court to assess the merits of either of the scientific points of 
view argued before it and to substitute its assessment for that of the Commu-
nity institutions, on which the Treaty confers sole responsibility in that regard. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court nevertheless finds that the parties’ 
arguments, supported in each case by the opinions of eminent scientists, 
show that there was great uncertainty, at the time of adoption of the contested 
regulation, about the link between the use of virginiamycin as an additive in 
feedingstuffs and the development of streptogramin resistance in humans. 
Since the Community institutions could reasonably take the view that they 
had a proper scientific basis for a possible link, the mere fact that there were 
scientific indications to the contrary does not establish that they exceeded the 
bounds of their discretion in finding that there was a risk to human health.’
Despite the limited review, the CFI devotes more than 200 paragraphs to the 
standard of review and the review of the Community institution’s opinion on 
the facts. 
The much discussed case of Tetra Laval70 illustrates the more intensive 
review in competition law. This case merits special attention, because a 
complaint was lodged with the ECJ on the method of review applied by the 
CFI, claiming that this was too intensive.7 
67  Pfizer, at para. 99 and 20.
68  Pfizer, at para. 280 to 287.
69  Pfizer, at para. 9.
70  Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v. Commission [2002] ECR II-48.
7  Case C-2/0P Commission v. Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987; Pending Case C-4/06P 
Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v. Impala in this context is definitively worth 
mentioning. The appellants are of the view that the CFI misinterpreted the standard of 
reasoning and the standard of proof and exceeded its scope of judicial review by substantiat-
ing its own assessment of the facts and of the evidence for that of the Commission.
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The Commission declared the reported concentration Tetra Laval/Sidel 
incompatible with the common market. This new entity would obtain a 
dominant position in the PET market (polyethylene terephtalate, used for 
manufacturing plastic packaging) by using its existing dominant posi-
tion in the carton sector as a lever. The decision was annulled, because 
the Commission had provided insufficient proof for its conclusion that 
the potential leveraging would lead to the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position on the relevant markets. There was insufficient proof 
for the various findings of fact. Further, the Commission was criticized for 
having failed to conduct an accurate investigation. The CFI found that the 
Commission had conducted a one-sided investigation as it had considered 
only factors indicative of anti-competitive conduct and had ignored factors 
indicative of the opposite. The Commission was also criticised for having 
overestimated the likely level of growth of the PET sector. 
On appeal, the Commission argued that the CFI pays lip service to the 
test of manifest error of assessment, but that essentially, it substitutes its 
own opinion on the facts for the Commission’s opinion. The Commis-
sion argued that in requiring the Commission to submit convincing proof, 
the CFI administers too intensive a test. The ECJ declared this appeal 
unfounded: the CFI had applied a proper standard of review. Also in admin-
istering a test of reasonableness, a court must consider whether the evidence 
is factually accurate, reliable and consistent and whether all relevant infor-
mation has been gathered. 
‘Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion 
with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community 
Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of infor-
mation of an economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter 
alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information 
which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a 
review is all the more necessary in the case of a prospective analysis required 
when examining a planned merger with conglomerate effect.2 
By requiring accurate and convincing evidence, the CFI did not enhance the 
intensity of its review, according to the ECJ. Such requirements with respect 
to evidence relate to the core function of evidence, ‘which is to establish 
convincingly the merits of an argument or, as in the present case, of a deci-
sion on a merger’.7 Particularly high requirements of care are placed on the 
prospective analysis, all the more because this analysis concerns potential 
future events rather than past events for which often numerous data are 
72  Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, at para. 9.
7  Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, at para. 4.
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available. According to the ECJ, the extent to which the prospective analy-
sis is realistic can be determined only if this analysis is based on sound 
evidence.74 The CFI administered the proper judicial test. ‘It explained and 
set out the reasons why the Commission’s conclusions seemed to it to be 
inaccurate in that they were based on insufficient, incomplete, insignificant 
and inconsistent evidence.’75 For example, the CFI had established that only 
one of the three independent reports cited by the Commission contained 
relevant information on the use of PET packaging for milk. Further, it 
established that the market growth predicted in the report is rather insignifi-
cant. In addition, the CFI found that one of the Commission’s conclusions 
concerning the facts was inconsistent with undisputed data in other reports 
and that a specific analysis was incomplete, which made it impossible to 
confirm its forecast.76
Naturally, Pfizer and Tetra Laval are only two − remarkable − cases and do 
not necessarily represent the Community review in general. Nevertheless, 
they are worth examining from a national administrative law perspective, 
because they include the court’s specification of how it reviews an opinion 
on the facts by the administration. Moreover, decisions in cases like Tetra 
Laval appear to be formulated in such a manner that they may be used as 
a guideline for future cases.77 That the importance thereof should not be 
underestimated is also underlined by Bo Vesterdorf, former President of the 
CFI, when he discusses the manner of review in some competition cases. 
He personally thinks that the CFI has not changed its review but it has only 
defined its review in more precise terms. The manifest error test does not 
result in a detached review of the opinion on the facts. The court accurately 
examines whether an opinion on the facts can be based on the evidence 
gathered. The test of reasonableness does mean that the administration’s 
characterization of the facts is endorsed as a general rule if no or only small 
errors have been made in the fact-finding process:
‘I would reject the charge that the CFI had adopted a new approach to review-
ing substantive Commission MCR [Merger Control Regulation] decisions.’ 
74  Between the establishment of primary facts as well as the direct factual inferences drawn 
therefrom and the appreciation of the prospective economic analysis a clear distinction is 
made. Legal (2006), p. 0-; Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Certain Reflections on Recent Judgments 
Reviewing Commission Merger Control Decisions’, in: M. Hoskins & W. Robinson (eds.), A 
True European: Essays for Judge David Edward, Oxford: Hart 200, p. 6-44 and Vesterdorf 
(2005). In this publication of 2005 Vesterdorf also underlines the theoretical distinction 
between the standard of proof, which is primarily directed to the administration, and the 
standard of judicial review. 
75  Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, at para. 48.
76  Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, at para. 46.
77  J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006, p. clii.
78  Vesterdorf (200), p. 7.
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‘[…] the CFI has simply been more exacting latterly than it arguably was 
previously when applying the well-established principles to which I have 
referred. It has also, I believe rightly, required convincing proof for findings 
based on novel or contested economic theories. This follows, it must be 
recalled, considerable adverse academic analysis, as well as persistent criti-
cism from practitioners […] of the Commission’s perceived unparalleled role 
as investigator, prosecutor and judge in such cases. […]
Consequently, if the Commission presents a case for or against a merger […] 
in a contested decision in which, for example, it has clearly overlooked, under-
estimated or exaggerated the relevant economic data, drawn unconvincing, 
in the sense of implausible, direct inferences from primary material facts or 
adopted an erroneous approach to assessing the material facts, such failings 
may, depending on their cumulative effect in the context of the circumstances 
of the case viewed as a whole, suffice to constitute […] a manifest error of 
assessment. On the other hand, if no such (or very few or insignificant such) 
errors are found, then the CFI, even if it would not itself have subscribed the 
Commission’s economic assessment of the foreseeable effects of the merger 
and/or the adequacy of the commitments offered, should uphold the Commis-
sion’s findings.’
 5.4 Lessons to Dutch Administrative Law Courts
In the discussed case law, the administration’s task and the 
court’s task in the fact-finding process are distinguished, but – contrary to 
what is customary in Dutch legal literature – not sharply contrasted. The 
court does not establish the facts all over, but this does not mean that its 
review is restrained. The court requires proper substantiation of the assess-
ment of the facts in the decision and it assesses whether the evidence the 
administration has gathered has resulted in a sufficient degree of certainty. 
If the fact-finding process is reviewed intensively, the court also reviews to a 
great extent whether the facts established are accurate. 
More attention for the review of facts in a Community context could 
improve the testing of a duty of due care and duty to state reasons as applied 
in the Netherlands. I believe that there is need for this, considering the lack 
of clarity about the nature and intensity of this test in our national courts. 
The case law of the Dutch administrative law courts could specify that the 
courts are competent (and even obliged if the facts are disputed) to review 
whether the evidence is accurate, reliable and consistent, whether the admin-
istrative authority has gathered all relevant information and whether the 
evidence is convincing. If the administration has used expert information, 
the principles of ‘excellence, transparency and independence’ derived from 
EC case law could reveal a more specific review of the expert opinion. This 
does not mean that the Dutch administrative law courts do not apply such 
79  Versterdorf (200), p. 4.
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requirements at present. It is difficult to determine precisely the manner of 
review they do apply.80 The explicit specification of the above requirements 
could solve this problem to a great extent. Moreover, for the sake of clarity, 
it is important not to confuse the concept of the test of reasonableness with 
the concept of reviewing the facts in a detached way. The courts should 
accurately examine what conclusions are based on the evidence and whether 
the administration has gathered all relevant information. The limited nature 
of the test of reasonableness does not detract from the requirements with 
respect to the allocation of the burden of proof, the standard of proof and 
assessment of the evidence.8 
 6  Community Review of Facts and the Principle of 
Due Care 
In the previous section, it was pointed out that the Com-
munity courts review fact-finding conscientiously, even though they assess 
the appreciation of the facts only by administering the test of reasonable-
ness. This case law defines standards on the basis of which the courts may 
carry out their review. In addition to the emphasis put on the elements the 
courts assess, attention is also paid to the stage of preparation of the decision 
against which the appeal was filed. In this respect there is a clear parallel 
with Dutch administrative law. In reviewing the correctness of the facts, and 
particularly where it is difficult to establish the facts objectively, part of the 
judicial review concentrates on the standards to be heeded by the admin-
istration in its decision-making. The question whether the administration 
has taken heed of the principle of due care and the duty to state reasons, 
may become the main issue. EC case law also applies these requirements.82 
This duty to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement and finds 
expression in Article 25 EC and Article 4(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. The strong link established by the CFI and 
the ECJ between procedural requirements and the test of reasonableness 
with respect to factual assessments is remarkable in this context. Since Tech-
nische Universität München, it has been established case law that the courts 
should emphasize procedural requirements if a Community institution 
exercises a discretionary power: 
80  The obligation to justify judicial decisions, especially in the free evaluation of evidence, is 
stressed by Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, ‘Right to Proof and Rationality of Judicial Decisions’, in: 
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Maribel Narváez Mora, Law, Politics, and Morality: European Perspec-
tives II, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2006, p. 75-90.
8  Craig (2006), p. 466; Vesterdorf (2005). 
82  X. Groussot, General Principles of Community Law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 
2006, p. 25-257; Tridimas (2006), p. 406 et seq. In pending Case C-4/06P Bertelsmann 
and Sony Corporation of America v. Impala the extent of these principles form the main 
question when the Commission’s assessment of the facts is in dispute. 
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‘However, where the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal, 
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administra-
tive procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees 
include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine care-
fully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right 
of the person concerned to make his views known and to have an adequately 
reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual 
and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends 
were present.’3
The administration’s discretionary power is counterbalanced by a strict 
check on the extent to which procedural safeguards have been heeded.84 By 
virtue of the principle of due care and the duty to state reasons, the courts 
may require the administration to take account of all relevant circumstances 
and to investigate all elements of the file carefully; that it arranges sufficient 
expertise within its own organisation or engages an expert committee; that 
it recognizes the inconsistency of information and examines it in more 
detail; that it indicates explicitly that a request has been dismissed because 
of the absence of means of proof.85 By emphasizing the principle of due care 
and the principle to state reasons, the Community courts succeed in receiv-
ing the information they need for exercising their judicial check.86 In fact, 
these principles constitute the preliminary stage necessary for achieving the 
judicial review of facts as described in the previous section. By setting clear 
and strict requirements on the administration’s investigation of the facts and 
the statement of reasons underlying the factual assessment, the Commu-
nity courts are able to guarantee that their test of reasonableness actually 
provides legal protection. For example, it is possible to determine whether 
the Community institution has drawn logical conclusions from the evidence 
only if the decision is sufficiently supported by reasons. Procedural rights 
are utilized in order to achieve a proper substantive result of the matter. The 
Community courts then have sufficient material at their disposal to assess 
8  Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [99] ECR 
I-5469, at para. 4.
84  Cf. K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Community 
Competition Law’, Fordham International Law Journal 2007, p. 48 and 482.
85  See, besides Technische Universität München and Pfizer, at para. 7 by way of example: Case 
T-6/97 Ufex a.o. v. Commission [2000] ECR II-4055, at para. 65 et seq.; Case T-24/00 
Le Canne v. Commission [2002] ECR II-25, at para. 5 et seq.; Case T-285/0 Agraz a.o. v. 
Commission [2005] ECR II-06, at para. 49 et seq.; Case T-4/0 Shandong Reipu Biochemi-
cals v. Council [2006] ECR II-224, at para. 6 et seq.; Case T-228/02 Organisation des 
Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council [2006] ECR II-4665, at para. 59.
86  Cf. Craig (2006), p. 479-48; J. Schwarze, ‘Judicial Review of European Administrative 
Procedure’, [2004] Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, p. 94-96; Schwarze (2006), p. 
cli.
2
review of facts in administrative law procedures
whether the evidence is factually correct, reliable and consistent and whether 
the administrative authority has collected all relevant information. There 
is a specific interaction between the emphasis on procedural requirements 
and more intensive judicial review of fact-finding. ‘Between law and fact, the 
ECJ clearly puts consistency and relevance of the reasoning and sufficiency 
of the documentation on the side of facts because it is necessary that they 
be reviewed if there is any will to have an effective review conducted.’87 This 
case law illustrates that the distinction between review based on procedural 
requirements and review based on substantive legal grounds may be of 
minor significance.88
As described in the first three sections, the principle of due care, 
combined with the duty to state reasons, constitutes an important fact-find-
ing standard in Dutch administrative law as well. The principle constitutes 
both a standard for the administration’s conduct and a criterion for the court 
to review the assessment of the facts. In Dutch administrative law, too, the 
general principles of proper administration have been developed for the 
purpose of shaping the lawfulness check of the exercise of discretionary 
powers in particular.89 One of the differences, however, is that Dutch case 
law does not dictate that these principles should be checked very strictly 
where there is administrative discretion. Of course, it is fair to assume 
that the court will rely on the principles in the case of discretion, but the 
requirements arising from the principles are not worked out in great detail 
and explicitly emphasized. To the contrary, there seems to be reluctance to 
increase the duty to state reasons, as it may constitute a vehicle for the judici-
ary to substitute its own opinion for that of the administration.90 Another 
difference is that the Community courts do not simply define their review of 
facts by testing against the principle of due care and the duty to state reasons 
and that they formulate further requirements for the administration. Apart 
from these principles, they explicitly define elements on the basis of which 
they should carry out their own lawfulness check. 
87  Legal (2006), p. 4.
88  Cf. Craig (2006), p. 479 and Tridimas (2006), p. 408. Tridimas points out that by entrench-
ing process rights the ECJ finds an answer to the problem of a melting pot of national legal 
cultures, in which the degree of substantive scrutiny varies.
89  Van Wijk/Konijnenbelt & Van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht, Den Haag: Elsevier 
2005, p. 276.
90  Annual report of the Raad van State 2006, p. 00. See, for example, Raad van State 5 June 
2006, AB 2006, 295, at para. 2.6.6.
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 7 Conclusion and Final Observations 
If in actions before the national courts EC law is involved, 
EC law does not directly provide for the manner in which and the extent to 
which the national courts should review the fact-finding underlying a deci-
sion. The manner of review is part of the Member States’ procedural auton-
omy, though its procedural law must satisfy the requirements of equality 
and effectiveness. Review elements can be derived from EC law, which may 
also be normative to the national courts. In Upjohn, the ECJ indicated that 
the national courts cannot be expected to review facts more intensively than 
the ECJ itself does in similar cases. Accordingly, the Community test has a 
normative effect to a certain degree. A major part of this contribution deals 
with the nature of the Community review of fact-finding in direct appeals. 
The selection and emphasis of certain topics has been inspired by the debate 
on the proper review of facts in Dutch administrative law.
EC law also addresses the question whether the administration or the 
courts are responsible for the correctness of the assessment of the facts. 
The courts must verify whether the relevant decision is based on accurate 
facts, but it is not their task to establish the facts once more. This is almost 
inherent to administrative law procedures. EC law recognizes that the 
administration’s discretion in interpretation may include fact-finding to a 
certain extent as well. This situation occurs when the facts are complex, for 
example, in difficult economic analyses. In that case, the Community courts 
review the administration’s opinion on the facts by administering the test 
of reasonableness and consider whether there is a manifest error, abuse 
of power or the excessive use of power. In the course of time, this review 
has been intensified. Despite the administration’s discretionary power, the 
CFI closely examines whether the evidence on which the decision is based 
is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, whether the administrative 
authority has gathered all relevant information and whether the evidence 
is convincing. This explicit specification of the lawfulness check could be 
useful in Dutch administrative law as well. Dutch administrative law courts 
do review the administration’s fact-finding against the principle of due care 
and the principle to state reasons, but the specific elements included in the 
courts’ review of facts often remain invisible. The reasoning on whether 
the administration’s assessment of the facts can pass the review test is in 
general very limited. In addition, the Dutch administrative law courts’ atten-
tion is focused mainly on the requirements to be imposed on the adminis-
trative authority in the context of fact-finding. EC case law also provides an 
insight into the manner in which and the elements on the basis of which 
the courts subsequently review this fact-finding. Moreover, EC law provides 
more clarity on the meaning of the test of reasonableness in terms of the 
assessment of facts. A test of reasonableness does not restrict the courts’ 
task of closely examining the reliability of the evidence. Nor does the test 
of reasonableness prevent the courts from having the last word on the rules 
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of allocation of the burden of proof, standard of proof and assessment of 
evidence. These subjects are part of the courts’ domain. The test of reasona-
bleness does prevent the courts from substituting their own opinion on the 
facts for the administration’s opinion on the facts. Whenever the factual 
and evidential position may lead two reasonable persons to different assess-
ments, the margin of appreciation ought to be left to the administration. If 
the fact-finding is based on reliable evidence, the courts will not easily arrive 
at a different assessment of the facts. 
The ECJ and the CFI also apply procedural principles in their review of a 
Community institution’s factual assessment. They consider the procedural 
safeguards, including the principle of due care and the duty to state reasons, 
to be of more fundamental importance if a discretionary power is exer-
cised. The emphasis on these procedural principles is used for the benefit 
of the judicial review. As a result of the strict requirements with respect to 
the investigation of the facts and the statement of reasons underlying the 
administration’s opinion on the facts, the courts have the instruments to 
check the accuracy of that opinion. 
If we ultimately compare the method of review applied by the Commu-
nity courts to that of the Dutch Raad van State, both similarities and 
differences stand out. All in all, the Raad van State is not in an exceptional 
position when it reviews the decision mainly against formal principles and 
refrains from establishing the facts definitively. The Community courts also 
assess whether a Community institution could have arrived at a specific 
assessment of the facts. If they perceive defects in the fact-finding process, 
they will not establish the facts themselves. This is the administration’s 
responsibility. And as in national law, the principle of due care and the duty 
to state reasons are standards on the basis of which the fact-finding may be 
reviewed. But there are differences as well. The recognition that the admin-
istration’s discretion may also extend to fact-finding (‘basic data’) means that 
the Community courts apply the test of reasonableness – at least explicitly 
– with respect to fact-finding more frequently than the Raad van State. This 
conclusion does not mean, however, that the position of an interested party 
disputing the facts is less advantageous before the Community courts than 
before the Dutch administrative law courts. The former specify the lawful-
ness check to be applied much more precisely than the Raad van State does. 
In general, the Community courts indicate in more concrete terms against 
what standards the review is applied. In individual cases, they also indicate 
more clearly the concrete defects attached to the fact-finding. Even though 
the courts do not establish the facts themselves, the parties can understand 
the points where the factual assessment has failed to pass the test of criti-
cism. Though the Community courts do not assess the facts definitively, 
their decisions further the resolution of the dispute to a greater extent. The 
explicit specification of the review standard in EC case law could help to give 
further substance to the judicial review of fact-finding in Dutch administra-
tive law. 
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Of course, the question arises whether the Raad van State is obliged to 
amend its review on the basis of EC law. After Upjohn, the conclusion was 
soon drawn in Dutch legal literature that the method of review applied by 
Dutch administrative law courts was adequate. The Community courts 
themselves sometimes administer the test of reasonableness with respect 
to the facts, whereas the Raad van State nearly always subjects the facts to a 
full test and therefore, it was concluded, that the Raad van State provides the 
more legal protection. A violation of the principle of effective legal protection 
by the Dutch administrative law courts seems highly unlikely in this light. 
This contribution, though, does not endorse the conclusion that the Raad 
van State sets a higher standard of review. This contribution has shown that 
the CFI has intensified its application of the test of reasonableness in respect 
of factual assessments. At this juncture, the Community courts very accu-
rately review whether the administration’s opinion on the facts is based on 
sufficiently sound evidence. It appears that the Raad van State does not carry 
out such intensive review, as is shown by both the reasons underlying the 
decision and the empirical investigation of the review of facts on appeal.9
Accordingly, the question arises whether it is permissible that the 
national methods of review are less far-reaching than the methods of review 
applied by the Community courts in similar cases. In principle, this ques-
tion should be answered in the affirmative. The method of review is part 
of the Member States’ procedural autonomy. Consequently, it appears that 
the reasoning in Upjohn cannot be applied a contrario. Nevertheless, an 
overly restricted national test of the factual assessments in cases that involve 
EC law may eventually lead to a violation of the principle of effective legal 
protection. Such a violation will not easily be established, as must be recog-
nised. The question arises, however, whether there are sound arguments 
for the national and the Community courts to review in different ways. 
For both legal orders, arguments are advanced in favour of the intensity of 
review required. For the most part, these arguments are similar: the separa-
tion of powers preventing the courts from establishing the facts themselves, 
the risk of overburdening the courts, the need for effective legal protection 
of interested parties and the need for the administration being effectively 
checked. At present, the Community courts have struck a balance based 
on these arguments that differs from that of the Dutch administrative law 
courts. 
Arguments may be raised to explain this difference. The CFI applies an 
intensive test, after which an appeal may be filed with the ECJ. The compari-
son between the Raad van State and the CFI is not on an equal par, as the 
former renders a decision in the last instance and is allocated a different task 
for that reason – though it also deals with questions of fact. However, the 
counterargument can be advanced that the ECJ supports the CFI and speci-
fies the requirements that the judicial review of fact-finding should meet as 
9  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007).
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well. The Raad van State hardly provides any direction to the district courts 
with respect to the use of their investigative powers and on how to review the 
assessment of the facts.92 One could also argue that the intensified review of 
facts in EC law has been most apparent in competition law. The competent 
Dutch tribunal in that field tailored its test to the standard of the CFI. The 
importance of the interests at stake in competition law affects the applica-
tion of the standard of review, resulting in lengthy reasoning in the court’s 
judgments. There is definitely some truth in this, but, still, in national 
law there are cases where the interests are of similar weight. Moreover the 
intensified review of the Community courts is also noticeable in other fields 
of law. Another difference may lie with the procedural rights of interested 
parties in the adjudication process. Public consultation rights are in general 
less developed in the Community legal order compared to that of the GALA. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this observation. On the one hand, one 
could argue that interested parties need less intensive review in national 
court proceedings, because their interests are better protected in the prelimi-
nary stage. On the other hand, one can also argue that, as interested parties 
have been granted participation rights, intensive legal review is appropriate. 
In this manner, it is guaranteed that the administration will take public 
consultation and the hearing of interested parties particularly seriously with-
out just confining itself to reviewing procedural safeguards. In addition, the 
participation procedure provides for a great deal of material, which enables 
the courts to review the fact-finding intensively.9 Democratic control is an 
important difference in the national and Community legal order as well. I 
believe that this point, which in itself is relevant, is of limited significance 
to the fact-finding process.94 In principle, fact-finding is not the domain of 
politics. Insofar as policy considerations play a part in fact-finding, as they 
may in the case of complex facts based on expertise, parliamentary control 
will be almost non-existent, precisely because of the required expertise 
which Parliament lacks as well. The above variety of arguments do not 
automatically result in a single review method, but all in all, it is difficult 
to defend that the methods of review in a national and Community context 
should differ to a considerable degree. The question arises why the Commu-
nity courts chose to review fact-finding more intensively in order to achieve 
a different balance in these arguments. Craig refers to factors such as the 
establishment of the CFI, the increasing need for effective control of the 
administration after persistent criticism of the legitimacy of the EU, the situ-
ation that the EU is now so firmly based that it can stand an annulment and 
the need to compensate the lack of participation rights of interested parties 
in the courts.95 These factors cannot be simply translated into the national 
92  Barkhuysen, Damen et al. (2007), p. 69.
9  Cf. Craig (2006), p. 480.
94  Schuurmans (2005), p. 280. Cf. Caranta (2008), p. 95-96.
95  Craig (2006), p, 480 and 48.
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context. Nevertheless, I think it is a good idea to focus the national debate on 
enhancing the effectiveness of legal protection and a more definitive dispute 
resolution regime on the developments that the intensity of review in EC law 
has undergone.96
Despite the above arguments, the Dutch administrative law courts will 
not easily run the risk of withholding citizens effective legal protection as 
a result of their method of review. Nevertheless, the courts should not deal 
with the review of facts too easily. If the national courts subject the fact-find-
ing in a decision based on EC law to a test of reasonableness, there is a risk 
that they fail to recognise a violation of EC law. If the violation is established, 
there are circumstances in which the Member State may run the risk of 
being held liable for errors by courts in applying EC law. In Traghetti97 the 
ECJ emphasizes that the assessment of facts and evidence by the courts are 
an essential part of their task of administering justice. A very limited review 
of fact-finding may involve the risk of the courts making an error in review-
ing the facts and evidence, for which the Member State may be held liable. 
For this reason, shaping and developing the national duty of due care test is 
quite important. Legal practitioners and scholars could use EC case law to 
give more substance to the review of the facts in national administrative law 
procedures. A more uniformed review standard could enhance the harmoni-
sation and implementation of Community law. 
96  Caranta’s (2006) criticism on conceptual sloppiness of the Community courts on discretion 
in complex factual assessments I do not subscribe. Partly because in comparison to Dutch 
law courts the Community case law is more consistent, partly because the portrayal of the 
Glaxo case (Case T-68/0 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission [2006] ECR 
II-2969) is in my opinion not in line with para. 244.
97  Case C-7/0 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-577, at para. 7 to 40.
